Assuming that we have now adequately met the challenges to ethics considered in the previous chapter (relativism and egoism), let us move on in this chapter to the substance of the book, the major representatives of normative ethical theories which we find in the history of moral philosophy. As we have already indicated, there are two main types of ethical theories, "teleological" theories which judge the moral worth of an action by the consequences which it produces, and "deontological" theories which judge the moral worth of an action in terms of its intrinsic quality of obligation or duty. In following this outline, we will also be following, at least roughly, the historical progression of ethical theories from the ancient Greeks to the present, at least within Western philosophy. Teleological theories predominate, in other words, from the time of Socrates in the Fifth Century B.C.E. until Kant's introduction of deontological ethics in the late Eighteenth Century.

Like most of ethics, the teleological/deontological distinction arises out of ordinary experience and common sense. As we pointed out in the first chapter, the teleological conception is best suited to the analysis of "non- moral" values, while the deontological conception is best suited for the analysis of "moral" value. To get a feel for this distinction, consider Mugsy, a professional hitman, or hired killer. Mugsy is thoroughly professional. He always succeeds in killing his victims without getting caught or in any way implicating his client. Would we want to say that Mugsy was therefore "good?" Well, in one sense he is and in one sense he is not, and these are precisely the ordinary senses from which the teleological/deontological distinction springs. Mugsy is certainly a good hitman. In fact he is the best in the business, and his value to his clients is accurately reflected in the pay he receives for his excellent work. He is good in the sense that he efficiently fulfills the function and purpose for which he was hired.

This is the same "non-moral" sense in which we speak of a good hammer or a good hair drier. They perform very well the functions for which they were designed. A hammer is designed to pound in nails easily and swiftly and this particular hammer does this well. A hair drier is designed to dry hair quickly without burning one's head or singeing one's hair, and this particular hair drier performs this function very well. In the same sense, Mugsy has been hired to do a job, and he does it to perfection.

At the same time, however, there is clearly another sense in which it seems monstrous to say that Mugsy is "good." He may be a good hitman but he is not a good person. Although he is the best in his profession, this profession itself is bad. And not only "bad," it is, we would say, positively " evil." And this, too, helps bring out the flavor of the difference between the non-moral teleological good and the moral deontological good, for we would never say of even the worst hammer or hair drier that it was "evil." What Mugsy does for a living is not just bad, it is immoral. We blame him and criticize him for what he does and will punish him if we can catch him. We also wonder if he ever feels guilty about what he does for a living, though clearly we never blame, or punish a faulty hair drier or think it ought to feel guilty for failing to operate properly. Only of fellow human beings do we take this judgmental stance...